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The International Health Regulations (2005) – An Overview 
 
In 2005, the United States and the other Member States of the World Health Organization (WHO) 
agreed to a new approach to global health security. Recognizing that international agreements rooted in 
the nineteenth century no longer sufficiently addressed the health threats posed by novel, emerging, 
and reemerging pathogens such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and highly pathogenic 
H5N1 avian influenza, the World Health Assembly (WHA) adopted the revised International Health 
Regulations  [IHR (2005)].1 The revised IHR entered into force in June 2007. IHR (2005) obligate the now-
196 States Parties to develop the core capacities required to detect, assess, report, and respond to 
public health emergencies of international concern. The regulations cover biological, chemical, 
radiological/nuclear, and other threats to public health, regardless of origin (naturally, accidentally, or 
deliberately released). 
Over the past decade, governments, WHO, and international partners have devoted resources to the 
implementation of IHR (2005) as a framework for achieving global health security.  The IHR (2005) 
agreement emphasizes the obligations of States Parties to develop, strengthen, and maintain the core 
capacities needed to detect and respond rapidly to emerging events from the national to the local level, 
as defined in Annex 1 of the agreement (Figure 1).  
Figure 1:  Functional capabilities that must be achieved by States Parties to comply with IHR (2005) 
Source: summarized from IHR (2005) Annex 1  
IHR (2005) also placed new responsibilities on WHO to facilitate information-sharing and coordinate 
international responses when needed, and on the global community to support worldwide 
implementation. IHR Article 44 calls on States Parties to collaborate in the development of global 
capacities to detect and respond to biological events by sharing logistical, technical, and financial 
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support through various mechanisms (bilateral, regional networks and WHO regional offices, and 
international organizations). Article 44 provides a mechanism for engaging international partners in 
cooperative capacity-building efforts that mutually reinforce the provisions of the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention and UN Security Council Resolution 1540. 
To help States Parties and their international partners 
translate the IHR core capacity requirements into 
measurable activities, WHO developed tools that 
include the WHO IHR Core Capacity Monitoring 
Framework and the corresponding WHO IHR 
Monitoring Tool (IHRMT), initially published in late 
2010 and updated annually through 2013. 2  The 
Monitoring Framework identifies country-level 
indicators for eight core capacities, points of entry, 
and other hazards in addition to epidemic-prone and 
emerging infectious diseases (Box 1). The Monitoring 
Tool is intended to be used by national authorities to 
self-assess progress toward these country-level 
indicators for reporting to WHA, and to use in 
national planning. States Parties agreed to report 
their IHR implementation status to WHO by June 
2012, either affirming that they had achieved the IHR 
core capacities or requesting a two-year extension to 
meet their obligations. Despite significant worldwide progress toward building core capacities, only 40 
States Parties reported that they had fully implemented IHR (2005) by June 2012.  By late 2013, 118 
States Parties had successfully requested an extension through June 2014; the rest failed to support 
their requests with a national action plan (or submitted no report at all).3 Many nations either reported 
full implementation or requested a second, and final, 2-year extension request by the June 2014 
deadline, but as of August 2014, WHO had not yet announced how many States Parties would require 
additional time to implement the IHR core capacities effectively.  
 
IHR (2005) and Biological Risk Management 
The country level indicators detailed in the Monitoring Framework include attributes of a laboratory 
system capable of identifying and confirming priority events promptly, reliably, and safely.  Clinical and 
public health laboratories in developing regions (particularly at the sub-national level) often lack the 
resources to test for priority diseases and events, delaying the detection of public health threats.  
Establishing access to appropriate screening, diagnostic, and confirmatory testing, either through 
domestic capacities or through agreements with outside laboratory systems, is critical to supporting 
effective disease surveillance and to achieving IHR compliance.   
However, developing such capacities domestically may unintentionally create new risks to laboratory 
workers, the environment, and the broader global community.  For example, establishing laboratory 
Box 1:  IHR (2005) Core capacities and hazards 
 
IHR Core Capacities: 
1. National legislation, policy and financing 




6. Risk communication 
7. Human resources 
8. Laboratory 
Other obligations/Potential Hazards: 
9. Points of entry 
10. Zoonotic events 
11. Food safety 
12. Chemical events 
13. Radiation emergencies 
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capabilities to conduct tests that include propagation of pathogens increases the risk that laboratory 
workers could be unintentionally exposed to infectious agents, some of which have the potential for 
spread within the community, or that the pathogens could be vulnerable to unauthorized access, 
creating the potential for loss, diversion, or deliberate misuse. 
Recognizing this paradox, WHA adopted a second resolution in 2005 that called for Member States and 
WHO to mobilize resources and technical guidance necessary to enhance laboratory biosafety 
worldwide.   WHA Resolution 58.29 acknowledged that “the release of microbiological agents and toxins 
may have global ramifications…[and]…the containment of microbiological agents and toxins in 
laboratories is critical to preventing outbreaks of emerging and re-emerging diseases.4    
 
As national governments and their international partners invest in laboratory capacity-building to 
strengthen capacities to detect, assess, report, and respond to biological events and other public health 
emergencies of international concern, these global biological security and health security risks must be 
considered in balance. Expanding the number of labs worldwide capable of performing sophisticated 
diagnostic testing and research increases the chances of a biological exposure or release occurring, with 
potential implications for the local, regional, or even the global community.  On the other hand, 
establishing reliable and appropriate testing capabilities at each level of a national laboratory system 
reduces the risk that a natural, accidental, or deliberate outbreak might go undetected in the stages 
when prompt action could contain the event, or at least mitigate the consequences. Strategies aimed at 
enhancing laboratory capacities under IHR (2005) assume the necessity of taking on manageable, 
predictable risks in biosafety and biosecurity to allow health systems to identify, characterize, and 
respond to unpredictable, unmanageable risks more effectively. 
 
The IHR Monitoring Framework emphasizes the need to develop risk-based biological safety and security 
capacities for public health laboratory systems. While this guidance provides necessary flexibility, 
countries also face challenges in developing a systematic risk-based approach to biosafety and 
biosecurity across a complex, tiered laboratory system. Many existing tools for biological risk 
assessment focus on risks at the level of a facility or laboratory. Although such granular risk assessments 
ultimately support adoption of appropriate measures at the local level, national laboratory capacity-
building strategies that set minimum standards for diagnostic testing and commensurate biorisk 
mitigation measures at each level of a tiered, integrated laboratory system can help national decision 
makers and their international partners determine priorities for equipment, materials, and training.  
 WHO, the United States and other high-income governments, the European Union, and other 
international organizations have developed biosafety and biosecurity risk mitigation recommendations. 
However, much of the guidance embraced by high-income states and funding organizations derives 
from a paradigm developed for biomedical research and industrial laboratories, which face different 
risks and foster a different culture than diagnostic laboratories.  Low- and middle-income countries 
frequently grapple with the challenges of developing national legislation and/or regulatory frameworks 
for biorisk management when the costs of implementation might not be sustainable – or the regulations 
themselves enforceable – in the local context. Historically, the priorities of external funders have often 
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driven assistance for laboratory biological risk management programs in developing regions, sometimes 
giving rise to extensive and expensive physical controls that cannot be maintained by national 
governments.    
One avenue to understanding the general risks incurred when countries strengthen their diagnostic 
laboratory networks under IHR (2005) is to consider the capacities that must developed at each level of 
a tiered national laboratory network to identify priority diseases reliably and promptly.  To this end, we 
have developed a model that estimates the degree of risk incurred by manipulation of priority 
pathogens for appropriate screening, diagnostic, or confirmatory tests for a notional laboratory system 
from sample collection to waste management. We also reviewed the guidance, tools, and risk mitigation 
strategies available in each region.  With this information, we developed a typology that describes the 
general biorisk profile of laboratories at each level of a tiered national system that has been adequately 





What Are the IHR (2005) Laboratory Capacity Requirements? 
Rather than prescribe specific activities that States Parties must implement to achieve compliance, the 
IHR (2005) agreement describes a general timeline and functional capabilities.  Annex I of the IHR (2005) 
outlines the obligations on States Parties to strengthen their existing national systems to detect, report, 
notify, verify, and respond to potential public health emergencies of international concern at each level 
of government. The core capacity requirements at the national level include “laboratory analysis of 
samples (domestically or through collaborating centres).”5 
The IHR Core Capacity Monitoring Framework (2013 revision) describes five country-level indicators for 
Laboratories (Core Capacity 8):  
• A coordinating mechanisms for laboratory services is established;  
• Laboratory services are available to test for priority health threats;  
• Influenza surveillance is established;  
• Laboratory biosafety and laboratory biosecurity (biorisk management) practices are in place and 
implemented; and 
• Laboratory data management and reporting is established.6   
 
States Parties determine whether or not they have met these country-level indicators by comparing 
their current functional capabilities to a series of attributes – programs, policies, or processes grouped 
under each country-level indicator in the IHR Monitoring Framework.  These attributes are presented in 
the IHR Monitoring Tool for use by each National IHR Focal Point in conducting an annual self-
assessment, primarily for reporting to WHO (results are aggregated annually for a progress report to 
WHA) but can be used additionally for national planning purposes.   The attributes are categorized as 
foundational (-1), inputs and processes (1), outputs and outcomes (2), and additional achievements (3).  
States Parties have fully implemented the IHR, functionally reaching compliance, when they have 
achieved all of the attributes through level 2 for each core capacity.  
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Table 1: IHR Core Capacity Monitoring Framework – Laboratory Global Indicators and Attributes (Core Capacity 8) 7 
Indicator Attributes 
A coordinating mechanism for 
laboratory services is established. 
• A laboratory focal point identified for coordinating laboratory services 
• A national Plan of Action that includes essential functions of laboratories, minimum standards and 
licensing/registration, is available 
• Up to date policies disseminated to diagnostic laboratories, specifying minimal requirements in authorized 
laboratory services 
Laboratory services available to 
test for priority health threats. 
 
• A policy to ensure the quality of laboratory diagnostic capacities (e.g. licensing, accreditation, etc.) 
• National laboratory quality standards/guidelines are available 
• Access to networks of international laboratories to meet diagnostic and confirmatory laboratory requirements 
and support outbreak investigations for events specified in Annex 2 of IHR 
• National laboratory capacity to meet diagnostic and confirmatory laboratory requirements for priority diseases 
• Up to date and accessible inventory of public and private laboratories with relevant diagnostic capacity available 
• National reference laboratories participate successfully in External Quality Assessment schemes for major public 
health disciplines for diagnostic laboratories 
• More than 10 non-AFP (Acute Flaccid Paralysis) hazardous specimens per year referred to national reference 
laboratories for examination 
• National reference laboratories accredited to international standards or to national standards adapted from 
international standards 
• National regulations are compatible with international guidelines in force for the packaging and transport of 
clinical specimens 
• Functional system for collection, packaging and transport of clinical specimens 
• Sample collection and transportation kits been pre-positioned at appropriate levels for immediate mobilization 
during a PH event 
• Staff at national or relevant levels trained for the safe shipment of infectious substances according to 
international standards (ICAO/IATA) 
• Processes for shipment of infectious substances when investigating an urgent public health event consistently 
meet ICAO/IATA standards 
• Clinical specimens from investigation of urgent public health events are delivered to appropriate national or 
international reference laboratories within the appropriate timeframe of collection for testing or transport 
• At least 10 hazardous specimens per year is shipped internationally to a collaborating laboratory as part of an 
investigation or exercise 
Influenza surveillance is 
established. 
 
• Access to influenza testing, nationally or internationally 
• Rapid virological assessment of severe acute respiratory infections is in place 




Laboratory biosafety and 
laboratory biosecurity (biorisk 
management) practices are in 
place and implemented. 
 
• Biosafety guidelines accessible to laboratories 
• Regulations, policies or strategies for laboratory biosafety are available 
• A responsible entity is designated for laboratory biosafety and laboratory biosecurity 
• Relevant staff are trained in laboratory biosafety and laboratory biosecurity guidelines 
• An institution or person responsible for inspection (could include certification of biosafety equipment) of 
laboratories for compliance with biosafety requirements is identified 
• Biorisk assessment is conducted in laboratories to guide and update biosafety regulations, procedures and 
practice, including for decontamination and management of infectious waste 
 
Laboratory data management 
and reporting is established. 
 
• Priority pathogens for laboratory based surveillance are identified 
• Standard reporting procedures between laboratory services and the surveillance department, including 
timeliness requirements by class of pathogen, are established 
• SOPs for data management, data security and data quality exist at diagnostic laboratories 




By including a single attribute that sweepingly encompasses all “national laboratory capacity to meet 
diagnostic and confirmatory laboratory requirements for priority diseases,” the IHR Core Capacity 
Monitoring Framework and IHRMT confirm that States Parties must develop or otherwise obtain access 
to the laboratory capacities required to diagnose and confirm priority health threats in a safe, reliable, 
and timely way, but leave the mechanisms up to national decision makers.  Regional priority diseases for 
sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East/North Africa regions are described in Appendix 
1 of this report. 
What Are the IHR (2005) Priority Diseases? 
 
Rather than a specific list of priority health threats, the IHR (2005) incorporate an algorithm to help 
States Parties assess whether or not an event constitutes a potential public health emergency of 
international concern (or PHEIC) that must be notified to WHO.  The algorithm guides decision makers 
through a set of simple questions: 
• Is the public health impact of the event serious? 
• Is the event unusual or unexpected? 
• Is there a significant risk of international spread? 
• Is there a risk for international trade restrictions? 
 
If the answer to two or more of these questions is yes, the IHR direct States Parties to notify WHO. This 
flexibility allows risk assessment of novel emerging diseases and consideration of context. An outbreak 
that might be considered unusual or a serious threat to public health in one area might be routinely 
encountered or easily managed in another, depending on local disease burden and resources.  The 
decision-making algorithm, which is encompassed in Annex 2 of IHR (2005), also includes a list of four 
specific diseases that are “always notifiable” to WHO under IHR (2005), regardless of context.  
 
The guidance in the IHR Annex 2 decision instrument identifies a second category of diseases or events 
of concern based on their potential for serious public health impact and ability to spread internationally.   
Annex 2 directs national authorities to assess any events involving these diseases using the decision 
algorithm, implying an extra level of scrutiny for this short list of diseases of historical and regional 
significance. In a 2010 protocol designed to help States Parties assess national surveillance and response 
capacities, WHO identified an almost identical list of diseases as priority diseases for which States 
Parties should establish diagnostic and confirmatory testing capabilities.8   
Box 2: Diseases that must always be reported to WHO as public health emergencies of international 
concern (PHEIC) according to IHR Annex 2  
 
Diseases that are unusual or unexpected and may have serious public health impact 
1. Smallpox 
2. Poliomyelitis due to wild-type poliovirus 
3. Human Influenza caused by a new subtype 




Functions in a Tiered, Integrated Laboratory System 
 
Neither the IHR (2005) agreement nor the IHR Monitoring Tool includes a checklist of specific laboratory 
tests or facilities that must be implemented.  Instead, the regulations and the supporting technical 
guidance developed by WHO advise States Parties to achieve access to the diagnostic and confirmatory 
testing capabilities required to detect priority diseases.   This could be attained entirely through formal 
agreements between governments and institutions to allow access to laboratory testing across borders 
(a feasible arrangement, for example, for island nations with small populations), or by developing 
domestic capacities to conduct appropriate screening, diagnostic, and confirmatory testing for priority 
diseases at each level of the national health system. 
 
To characterize these capacities, we reviewed currently accepted laboratory standards for screening, 
diagnostic, and confirmatory testing for the infectious diseases identified as priority diseases or events 
in sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, or the Middle East and North Africa (see Appendix 1).  Sources 
included WHO laboratory manuals and other supporting technical guidance published either by WHO 
Headquarters or the regional offices; laboratory manuals and technical guidance published by the U.S. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); protocols published by laboratory credentialing 
organizations; and protocols published by professional/technical organizations such as the American 
Society for Microbiology or the American Society for Clinical Pathology.   
 
This guidance served as the framework for a matrix of screening, diagnostic, and confirmatory tests 
likely to be conducted at each level of a tiered, integrated laboratory system for all pathogen/diseases 
categorized as high-risk in the IHR assessment tool and supporting protocol, plus the additional priority 
diseases described above for each region. 
 




• Yellow fever  
• Viral hemorrhagic fevers (e.g., Ebola, Lassa, Marburg) 
• West Nile fever 
• Anthrax* 
• Other diseases that are of special national or regional concern, such as dengue fever, Rift 
Valley fever, and meningococcal disease. 
 
* Included in WHO Protocol for Assessing National Surveillance and Response Capacities for the International 
Health Regulations (2005) in Accordance with Annex 1 of the IHR: A Guide for Assessment Teams but not in IHR 
Annex 2.   
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In the absence of specific guidance on testing levels in the pathogen-specific technical protocols, we 
applied the logical framework of the consensus recommendations for laboratory harmonization 
developed in conjunction with the Maputo Declaration on Strengthening of Laboratory Systems.  The 
Maputo Declaration resulted from a meeting of major stakeholders convened by WHO in 2008 to 
develop a consensus on the laboratory capabilities needed to support appropriate diagnosis and care of 
tuberculosis, malaria, and HIV at the population level in order to achieve the disease reduction targets in 
the Millennium Development Goals.9   
 
Major partners in development and technical assistance (including the US Agency for International 
Development and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) who participated in the Maputo 
consensus process also developed detailed operational recommendations that urged decision makers to 
harmonize the tests, supplies, and equipment available at each laboratory service level as part of a 
national laboratory strategic plan. This would include adopting minimal nationwide standards for 
diagnostic tests and services offered at four health services levels:  
• Level I-Primary: rapid diagnostic testing and simple microscopy at health post and health center 
laboratories; 
• Level II- District: additional microscopic staining and serology services in small referral hospitals;   
• Level III-Regional/Provincial: in addition to the above, microbiology culture, biochemical testing, 
and drug susceptibility testing, as well as limited molecular diagnostics (PCR); 
• Level IV-National/Multi-country Reference Laboratory: complete menu of confirmatory tests, 
including qualitative and quantitative nucleic acid testing and antimicrobial resistance testing.10 
Although these standards explicitly addressed diagnostic services only for tuberculosis, malaria, and HIV, 
they provide a conceptual framework that can be extrapolated to other priority endemic, epidemic-
prone, and emerging infectious diseases in resource-constrained settings, especially where WHO has not 
published disease-specific guidance.  
 
Comprehensive Biorisk Management 
 
The introduction of infection control, laboratory biosafety, and laboratory biosecurity measures can 
significantly reduce the risks posed at all stages of specimen collection and diagnostic testing. Biological 
risk challenges and general mitigation measures are outlined in Figure 2. For healthcare providers and 
laboratory workers who evaluate patients and collect and process patient samples, infection control and 










Figure 2:  Biological risk mitigation relies on various measures at different stages of diagnostic testing. 
 
Infection Prevention and Control in Healthcare Settings 
In recent decades, several emerging infectious diseases – such as Ebola virus disease, SARS, and the 
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome-coronavirus (MERS-CoV) – have spread among patients, healthcare 
workers, and their contacts, undermining efforts to detect and respond rapidly to outbreaks.  Core 
Capacity 4 (Response) in the WHO IHR Monitoring Framework addresses attributes related to infection 
prevention and control, or measures designed to limit the spread of infections in healthcare settings. 
Healthcare and laboratory workers who collect, process, and analyze patient specimens are at particular 
risk of exposure to communicable diseases.  To minimize the risks of healthcare-associated infections in 
healthcare and laboratory workers, patients, and their contacts, including the emergence and spread of 
antimicrobial resistance, appropriate precautions must be taken during patient evaluation, transport, 
and treatment. 
WHO has convened groups of experts to review and compile guidance for infection prevention and 
control measures.11  This guidance includes transmission-based precautions for diseases such as specific 
acute respiratory infections that could constitute public health emergencies of international concern, to 
be undertaken in addition to the routine use of Standard Precautions for all patients.12 The universal 
precautions (focused primarily on exposures to blood-borne pathogens) and standard precautions 
(which include all human tissue and fluids) developed by CDC illustrate national guidelines for intended 
to protect healthcare and laboratory workers, patients, and the community from the spread of 
healthcare-associated infections.  Standard precautions include: 1) hand hygiene, 2) use of personal 
protected equipment, 3) safe injection practices, 4) safe handling of potentially contaminated 





While infection prevention and control measures primarily address human-to-human transmission of 
infectious diseases in clinical settings, laboratory biosafety measures pertain to efforts to reduce the risk 
of laboratory-acquired infections or other hazardous exposures during sample/specimen handling.  
WHO defines biosafety as the “the containment principles, technologies and practices that are 
implemented to prevent unintentional exposure to pathogens and toxins, or their accidental release,” 14 
and laboratory biosafety and biosecurity attributes are included in the IHR Monitoring Framework.   
Laboratory biosafety measures include risk assessment, standard operating procedures, consistent use 
of safe techniques, training, personal protective equipment (PPE), engineering controls, and facility 
infrastructure and workflow. Primary containment measures include PPE and biosafety cabinets 
(workstations that rely on some combination of directional airflows, filters, and physical barriers to 
protect laboratory workers from exposure to pathogens during manipulations). Secondary containment 
includes barriers that prevent the spread of pathogens to other workers and to the community at large, 
such as airflow management and filtration and waste decontamination systems.15 
The third edition of the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual, published in 2004, references CDC’s 
standard precautions as the basis for safe handling of all specimens in the diagnostic laboratory.16 The 
guidance outlines a risk-based approach to developing biosafety containment infrastructure and 
personnel practices to mitigate accidental exposure to a pathogen. To assist Member States in the 
development of functional laboratory capacity, WHO also developed the Laboratory Assessment Tool 
(LAT), most recently updated in 2012.17 The LAT describes a framework for laboratory personnel to 
assess laboratory quality management, including facility and national biosafety practices, and includes 
measures to facilitate general biological risk assessments of individual facilities.  
Additional precautions that address the specific risks of laboratory-acquired infections have been 
developed by several entities, including CDC and the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH), WHO, and 
the European Union. (See Appendix 2 for a list of published infection control and biosafety guidelines.) 
The manual of Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL),18an advisory document 
developed by CDC and NIH, provides comprehensive recommendations for identification and reduction 
of risks in laboratories handling infectious pathogens. The recommendations in BMBL cover diagnostic 
and biomedical research laboratories. It outlines four containment levels, from biosafety level 1 to 
biosafety level 4 (BSL 1-4), outlining risk mitigation recommendations derived from a consequence-
based methodology.  These recommendations are referenced widely within the U.S. and internationally 
as a framework for minimizing the risk of laboratory-acquired infections.  
Biosecurity approaches in diagnostic laboratories  
While laboratory biosafety practices focus on mitigating the risks of accidental exposures and 
laboratory-acquired infections, laboratory biosecurity practices aim to prevent the loss, theft, misuse, 
diversion and/or intentional release of pathogens and toxins during handling or storage of biological 
materials. Biosecurity risk mitigation strategies include risk assessments, personnel surety processes, 
physical controls to prevent unauthorized access, pathogen storage management and inventory 
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systems, biohazard disposal, information security, safe and secure sample packaging and transport, and 
monitoring and accountability during specimen handling, analysis, and storage. 
Generally, diagnostic laboratories face slightly different concerns than biomedical research facilities 
where high-consequence pathogens are studied.   Patient specimens and environmental samples are 
highly impure, dilute, and relatively unstable sources of pathogens. The increasing sensitivity and 
specificity of many diagnostic technologies have diminished the amount of propagated specimens and 
purified controls required. Most diagnostic laboratories, particularly those below the central reference 
level, are not equipped for manipulation of large amounts of enriched pathogens.  
Typical approaches to reduce biosecurity breaches have focused on improving physical security and 
access to dangerous pathogens. Measures to improve security at the facility level include proper sample 
packaging procedures, secure modes of sample transport, preventing access to work spaces and 
samples by unauthorized personnel, promoting awareness of biosecurity concerns through training for 
laboratory workers and managers, and instituting personnel reliability measures (as practical).  
Biosecurity risks are generally considered to be minimal in most clinical laboratory settings due to the 
fact that patient samples are uncharacterized, impure, unstable, and contain relatively small amounts of 
pathogens. Research and industrial laboratories, and to some degree central reference laboratories that 
carry out culture and archiving of pathogen isolates, generally store larger quantities of more highly 
purified materials and therefore are a more likely target for theft or diversion.  Nonetheless, because 
diagnostic laboratories may handle and store patient specimens or concentrated pathogen samples that 
could be misused, appropriate controls are necessary to prevent unauthorized access to pathogens and 
to reduce the possibility, however slight, that equipment and materials could be stolen or misused. 
Comprehensive Biological Risk Management 
In the last decade, the U.S., the United Kingdom, Japan, and a few other high-income countries have 
strengthened their own domestic laboratory biosecurity programs (such as the U.S. Select Agent 
Program), offering lessons learned for national biosecurity policy and regulatory frameworks. WHO’s 
2006 Laboratory Biorisk Management Guidance describes elements of a national biorisk program, but 
does not endorse specific standards.19  
In 2012, WHO published a new five-year strategic framework outlining WHO’s role in coordinating 
international efforts to develop standards for laboratory biological risk management.20  These efforts 
primarily revolve around the setting of process standards for biological risk management organized by 
the European Committee for Standardization (CEN).  In 2008, under the CEN Workshop process, a 
committee that included representatives of European and U.S. biosafety associations collaborated to 
generate a voluntary document, CEN Workshop Agreement 15793 – Laboratory Biorisk Management, 
(CWA 15793), which outlines international standards for laboratory biosafety and biosecurity that can 
be used as a basis for national biorisk management standards.21 Committees also developed two 
supporting documents, CWA 16393:2012 (Guidelines for the implementation of CWA 15793)22 and CWA 
16335:2011 (Biosafety Professional Competence).23 After minor updates in 2011, CWA 15793 is currently 
scheduled to expire at the end of 2014 per normal CEN processes, although the European Biosafety 
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Association and Sandia National Laboratories in the U.S. have collaborated to map a path forward for 
the guidance, from conversion to an ISO International Standard to more permanent stewardship of the 
document by another organization.24  Sandia National Laboratories has also developed a laboratory 
biosafety risk assessment methodology tool (BIORAM) that takes into account specific laboratory 
requirements and pathogen-based risks.25  This methodology has aided facilities in developing tailored 
biosafety approaches in diverse settings.  
WHO has recognized that biological risk management is an integral part of functional laboratory 
capacity. The WHO IHR Monitoring Framework includes a number of country-level indicators to measure 
progress toward full achievement of the required Laboratory core capacities (Table 1).  The country-level 
indicator for laboratory biosafety and biosecurity includes such attributes as development of a national 
laboratory biosafety regulatory framework, resources for certification of biosafety equipment, training 
in biosafety and biosecurity, and facility-level biorisk assessments.26  Each of the States Parties to IHR 
has the responsibility to interpret these requirements within the national context, and to adapt existing 
guidance and systems accordingly. 
Facility-based risk assessment will always provide information appropriate to developing and 
implementing a biorisk management plan tailored to an institution’s specific infrastructure and 
workload.  However, predictive information on the general nature of the biological risks faced by 
laboratory workers trained and equipped to perform a standardized testing menu could help 
stakeholders anticipate needs and integrate sustainable and appropriately scaled biological risk 
management strategies into strategic planning and budget development when strengthening  diagnostic 
laboratory networks.   
Estimating Biological Risks  
Based on the IHR core capacity requirements and existing frameworks for biological risk management, 
we sought to address three primary questions:  
• What is the general biological risk profile of diagnostic/public health laboratories at each health 
service level (1-4) within a national health system that has achieved IHR compliance (i.e., fully 
implemented the core capacity requirements)? 
• Can any biological risks potentially created by strengthening and sustaining IHR-relevant 
diagnostic capacities in national laboratory systems be predicted reliably and generally enough 
to inform capacity-building strategies? 
• What tools are needed and available to manage biological risks in public health laboratory 
networks, particularly in low and middle income countries?   
To characterize the risks likely to be enhanced by strengthening of the capacities of a tiered, integrated 
national laboratory network to test for priority diseases, we sought to develop a matrix that would 
reflect pathogen-specific characteristics, risks posed by manipulation of samples at all stages of a 
laboratory system, and risks to the community and the individual. In this context, laboratory biological 
risk is defined as the risk to an individual and community posed by accidental or intentional release of a 
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pathogen during specimen collection, manipulation, analysis, and storage in a diagnostic laboratory 
system.  
Priority Pathogens 
Obviously, the pathogens being investigated in any laboratory play a key role in determining biological 
risks. Guidance such as the BMBL focuses on pathogen characterization to prescribe risk mitigation 
strategies and specific personal, engineering, and infrastructure protections. However, pathogens may 
pose different levels of risk depending on not only on transmission rates and routes, but on means of 
specimen collection and the diagnostic tests being conducted.  
To develop a technical framework for assessing the biological risks for “IHR compliance,” we first 
developed a notional priority disease list representing emerging, epidemic-prone, and high-priority 
endemic diseases frequently identified as public health threats in Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, 
and the Middle East and North Africa. As detailed in Appendix 1, we reviewed reportable disease 
requirements developed by 9 ministries of health in low and middle income countries and by 1 sub-
regional and 1 regional disease surveillance partnership to identify diseases/conditions frequently 
designated as notifiable within each region.  The list includes the four always notifiable diseases under 
the IHR (2005) Annex 2 algorithm (smallpox, novel influenza strains, wild-type poliovirus, and SARS) as 
well as the “always consider” pathogens, which also appear on most priority disease lists from case 
study countries in the three regions. The notional “global” priority disease list extrapolated from all 
three regions is shown in Table 2.  
Table 2: Global Priority Infectious Disease Threats – A Notional Reportable Disease List 
 
Viral Diseases Bacterial Diseases Parasitic Diseases 
• Chikungunya 
• Dengue  
• Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers 
(Ebola, Marburg, Rift Valley 
fever, Crimean-Congo 
Hemorrhagic fever, Lassa 
fever) 
• Hepatitis viruses (A, B, C, D, E) 
• HIV 
• Influenza  
• Japanese Encephalitis Virus‡ 
• Measles 





• Yellow Fever 
• Anthrax 
• Brucellosis 








• Typhoid Fever 




*Sub-Saharan Africa only; ‡Southeast Asia only; ¶Middle East only 
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Functional laboratory capacities for notional priority disease list 
Using the notional priority disease list, we reviewed current published guidance to identify the 
screening, diagnostic, and confirmatory tests recommended for each priority disease or pathogen, based 
on the best available current guidance. To identify “gold standard” laboratory testing algorithms, the 
research team reviewed laboratory manuals, standard operating protocols (SOPs), and other relevant 
technical guidance.  The team considered guidance published by: 
1. WHO Headquarters or WHO regional offices, 
2. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),  
3. Laboratory standards-based credentialing organizations (such as the Clinical and Laboratory 
Standards Institute), and 
4. Professional organizations such as the American Society for Microbiology and the American 
Society for Clinical Pathology.  
When multiple sources of guidance existed, the team selected the most authoritative source in the 
order listed above.  These provided a information to define screening, diagnostic, and confirmatory tests 
likely to be conducted at each level of a tiered, integrated laboratory system for each priority disease.  In 
the case of some diseases, WHO or other guidance describes the tests that should be conducted at the 
health facilities level, at intermediate (i.e., district or provincial) laboratories, and at the reference level.  
In the absence of pathogen-specific guidance, we applied the logical framework of the Maputo 
Declaration on Strengthening of Laboratory Systems (see page 11 of this report). 
Table 3 illustrates this process for differential diagnostic testing in suspected cases of Brucella, a 
pathogen identified as a biosecurity concern for US biosecurity policies and one of the most notorious 
causes of serious laboratory-acquired infections. 
  Table 3. Determine diagnostic and specimen collection needs for each pathogen: Brucella spp.








 Rose Bengal test (P)  Serum (blood)  2  P
 Serum tube agglutination test  Serum (blood)  2  P
 ELISA (serology)  Serum (blood)  2  C
 Coombs indirect IgG  Serum (blood)  2  C
 Microagglutination test  Serum (blood)   2  C
Immunocapture agglutination 
 test (Brucella Capt)
 Serum (blood)
 2  C
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Blood culture, microbiological 
 testing, and microscopy
 Blood
 3  C
 PCR  Blood  3  NS
   P = presumptive; C = confirmatory; NS = not yet standardized
 
We repeated this process for each of the pathogens/diseases on the notional priority disease list and 
used this to develop an aggregated list of the tests for each pathogen, together with the most 
appropriate specimen collection techniques, needed to carry out appropriate screening, diagnostic, and 
confirmatory tests across a national diagnostic laboratory network. 
Defining biorisk profiles 
We applied standard epidemiological parameters used to measure the severity of disease to develop a 
qualitative scale for the risk of exposure/transmission to laboratory workers, and from laboratory 
workers to the community, incurred during collection and manipulation of specimens for each priority 
pathogen. These parameters included: 
• Severity: average case fatality rate (CFR) – varies by pathogen; 
• Transmissibility: basic reproductive rate (R0) – varies by pathogen; and 
• Exposure risk based on specimen collection and manipulation – varies by diagnostic platform. 
A detailed quantitative scoring scale is presented as a proof of concept in Appendix 4 that canonical risk 
equations based on these epidemiological and exposure parameters (based on studies of accidental 
exposures among healthcare workers, including laboratory workers) can be used to generate 
quantitative scores for planning and priority-setting by decision makers.  
 
Qualitative, rapid assessment of biological risk data using previously published risk assessments, such as 
the BMBL, WHO, European, and American Biosafety Association (ABSA) risk scoring scales,27 can be 
arrayed using the same logical framework to develop a biorisk profile at each level of a tiered, 
integrated diagnostic laboratory network associated with the development of a set of aggregated 
testing platforms, even in the absence of the specific estimates for transmission risk, etc., described in 
the detailed calculations in Appendix 4. 
 
Table 4a-d estimate the biological risks posed at each health service level, assuming the development of 
appropriate screening, diagnostic, and confirmatory capacities for the notional priority disease list, using 
a binary coding scheme.  In this scheme, platforms that potentially generate aerosols during pathogen 
manipulation received a score of +2 on a binary scale (0/2). Pathogens recognized as high-consequence 
due to transmissibility, virulence, case fatality rate, and availability of treatments (as indicated through 
designation at the Biosafety 3+/4 level within the BMBL framework) also received a score of +2, and 
those with the potential for human-to-human transmission received an additional +1 score. 
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The major laboratory exposure risk pathways were based on a broad review of the existing literature on laboratory exposures, which tend to be 
descriptive or qualitative rather than prospective, denominator-based studies.  Where the literature described laboratory-acquired infections 
(LAI) based on known exposure risks/transmission pathways, we identified those as the major laboratory exposure risks, regardless of the 
number of cases reported globally, or of the exposure-based transmission risks.  Based on these exposure risks, we identified needs for 
appropriate biorisk mitigation tools necessary for laboratory biosafety.  We also developed an aggregate biorisk profile based on fully achieving 
capacities to conduct appropriate tests for the complete notional priority disease list at each level of a national laboratory system, including 
likely biosafety and biosecurity concerns at each laboratory level.   
 
Table 4a: Risks at laboratory service level 1 by platform  
The table below uses the following standard abbreviations: 
P = parenteral; M = mucosal; I = ingestion; A = aerosol; PPE = personal protective equipment; BSC = biosafety cabinet; SP = standard precautions 
Table 4a Service Level 1               
Platform or 


















Rapid Diagnostic (& 
collection) 
Cholera Stool no 2 2 0 M SP 





Hepatitis Serum no 2 A: 2; B: 
2/3; C: 3; 




HIV Blood, serum, 
plasma, dried blood, 
urine, saliva 
no 2 3 0 
P  SP 
Lymphatic filariasis Whole Blood no 2 2 0 I SP 
Malaria Whole Blood no 2 2 0 Minimal risk SP 
Plague Whole Blood yes 2 3 0 M/I SP 
Rabies Brain (post-mortem) yes 2 3 1 A SP 
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Bacterial Staining (& 
collection) 
Leprosy skin smear no 2 3 0 
Minimal risk SP 
Light Microscopy (& 
collection) 
Tuberculosis Sputum yes 2 3 0 A SP; PPE 
Onchocerciasis Skin snip/nodule 
biopsy 
no 2 2 0 Minimal risk SP 
Specimen Collection 
only 
Anthrax Blood, skin lesion 
exudates, CSF, 
pleural fluid, sputum 
(occasionally urine & 
feces) 






M SP; PPE 
Brucellosis Blood, serum, bone 
marrow aspirate, 
tissue 
yes 2 3 0 
P SP; PPE 
Buruli ulcer biopsy, ulcer smear no 2 2 0 Minimal risk SP 
Chikungunya Serum no 3 2 0 Minimal risk SP 
Crimean Congo 
hemorrhagic fever 
Whole blood, serum, 
plasma, blood clot, 
or tissue 
unlikely 4 4 1 
P/M/A - 
HIGH 
SP; PPE (enhanced 
IPC precautions) 
Diphtheria Nose, throat, wound 
swab 
yes     0 
A SP (plus vaccine) 
Dracunculiasis No lab diagnostic no 2 2 0 No specimen needed 
Ebola virus disease Whole blood, serum 
or plasma, skin or 
tissue from fetal 
cases 
possibly 4 4 1 
P/M/A - 
HIGH 




















M/A SP; PPE 
Lassa Fever Whole blood, blood 
clot, tissues, serum 
or plasma 
yes 4 4 1 
P/M/A - 
HIGH 




Malaria Whole Blood from 
venipuncture or 
finger prick 
no 2 2 0 
Minimal risk SP 
Marburg Whole blood, blood 
clot, serum/plasma, 
or tissue 
possibly 4 4 1 
P/M/A - 
HIGH 






yes 2 2 1 
M/A SP; PPE 
Meningococcal 
meingitis 
CSF, blood yes 2 2 0 
P SP 
Polio Stool, pharynx swab unknown 2 2 0 Minimal risk SP 
Rift Valley fever Whole blood, serum, 
plasma, blood clot, 
or tissue 
yes 3 3 0 
M/A SP; PPE 










A SP; PPE (enhanced IPC precautions) 
Shigella Stool sample no 2 2 0 Minimal risk SP 
Smallpox (rule out) Biopsy specimen, 
scabs, vesicular fluid, 
pustule material, 
blood samples 
yes 4 4 1 
P/M SP; PPE 
Trachoma No lab diagnostic no     0 No specimen needed 
Trypanosomiasis Whole blood, lymph 
node aspirates, 
cerebrospinal fluid 
no 2 2 0 
Minimal risk SP 
Typhoid fever Stool sample, blood, 
urine, bone marrow 
no 2 2/3 0 
P/I SP 
West Nile fever Whole blood, serum, 
plasma, tissue 
no 2 3 0 
P/A SP; PPE 




Table 4b: Risks at laboratory service level 2 by platform  
The table below uses the following standard abbreviations: 
P = parenteral; M = mucosal; I = ingestion; A = aerosol; PPE = personal protective equipment; BSC = biosafety cabinet; SP = standard precautions 
 
Table 4b Service Level 2               
Platform or 


















Anthrax Serum yes 2 for non-aerosol; 3 for aerosol and lg quantities 
3 0 
M/A SP/PPE (centrifuge safety) 
Brucellosis Serum yes 2 for specimens; 3 for cultures 
  0 
M/A/I SP; PPE 
Buruli ulcer Serum no 2 3 0 
Minimal risk SP 
Chikungunya Serum no 3 3 0 Minimal risk SP 
Dengue Serum no 2 1 (Aus.) - 3 (Euro/UK) 0 P SP 
Hepatitis Serum no 2 A: 2; B: 
2/3; C: 3; 
D: 3; E: 2/3 
0 
M/P SP; PPE 
HIV Serum no 2 3 0 M/P SP; PPE 
Lymphatic filariasis Serum no 2 2 0 I  SP 
Measles Serum yes 2 2 0* P/A SP; PPE 
Plague Serum yes 2 3 1 
M/A/I SP/PPE (centrifuge safety) 
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A SP; PPE (dilute specimens) 
Yellow Fever Serum no 3 3 0 M/P SP; PPE 
Bacterial Staining of 
heat fixed smear 
Anthrax Blood, pleural 
effusion, swab of 
lesion, 
cerebrospinal fluid 
yes 2 for non-aerosol; 3 for aerosol and lg quantities 
3 0 
M SP; PPE 
Brucellosis Culture, bone 
marrow, CSF, 
wound/pus swab 
yes     1 
A/I SP; PPE 
Meningococcal 
Meningitis 
Cerebrospinal fluid yes 2 2 1 
M/A SP - heat fixation/drying 
Plague Bubo aspirate, 
sputum, blood 
smears, and tissues 
yes 2 3 0 
M SP - heat fixation/drying 
Tuberculosis Sputum yes 2 for non-aerosol; 3 for aerosol and lg quantities 
3 0 
A SP - heat fixation/drying 
Buruli ulcer Biopsy, smear from 
ulcer 
no 2 3 0 Minimal risk SP 
Parasitic Staining 
Lymphatic filariasis Whole Blood no 2 2 0 Minimal risk SP 
Malaria Whole Blood no 2 2 0 Minimal risk SP 
Trypanosomiasis Whole blood, lymph 
node aspirates, 
cerebrospinal fluid 
no 2 3 0 
Minimal risk SP 
Serum Agglutination 
Brucellosis blood/serum yes     1 
A SP/PPE 






yes 2 2 1 





Anthrax Blood, pleural 
effusion, swab of 
lesion, 
cerebrospinal fluid 
yes 2 for non-aerosol; 3 for aerosol and lg quantities 
3 0 
M/A SP/PPE (centrifuge safety) 
Influenza Throat swab, 
nasopharyngeal 





yes 2 (seasonal); 3 (when HPAI-suspected) 
2 ( higher for HPAI strains) 1 (for NPA spec.) 
M/A SP/PPE 
Plague Bubo aspirate, 
sputum, blood 
smears, and tissues 
yes 2 3 1 (for 
aspirate) A SP/PPE (centrifuge safety) 
Indirect 
Immunofluorescence 






A SP/PPE (centrifuge safety) 
Haemagglutination 
Inhibition 
Dengue Serum no 2 1 (Aus.) - 3 (Euro/UK) 0 P SP/PPE 
Influenza Blood/serum yes 2 (seasonal); 3 (HPAI or 1918-related work) 
2 (though may be higher for some strains) 
0 
M/A SP/PPE 
Rapid Diagnostic Test 
Trypanosomiasis Whole blood, lymph 
node aspirates, 
cerebrospinal fluid 
no 2 2 0 
Minimal risk SP 
LED Microscopy 
Tuberculosis Sputum yes 2 for non-aerosol; 3 for aerosol and lg quantities 
3 0 




Table 4c: Risks at laboratory service level 3 by platform  
The table below uses the following standard abbreviations: 
P = parenteral; M = mucosal; I = ingestion; A = aerosol; PPE = personal protective equipment; BSC = biosafety cabinet; SP = standard precautions 
Table 4c Service Level 3               
Platforms or 







Group Score Risk Mitigation 
Bacterial Culture 
Anthrax Swab of lesion, 
whole blood, 
fluids/aspirate, 
tissue, blot clot, 
serum, stool 
yes 2 for non-aerosol; 3 for aerosol and lg quantities 
3 1 
M/A SP/PPE/BSC 
Brucellosis Blood (preferred), 
bone marrow, 
cerebrospinal fluid, 
wound swab, pus 
yes 
    1 
M/A/I SP/PPE/BSC 
Buruli ulcer Blood (preferred), 
bone marrow, 
cerebrospinal fluid, 
wound swab, pus, 
Biopsy, ulcer smear 
no 2 3 0 
Minimal risk SP 




sediment or blood 
yes 2 2 1 
P/A SP/PPE (centrifuge safety) 
Plague Bubo aspirate, blood, 
cerebrospinal fluid, 
sputum 
yes 2 3 1 
M/A SP/PPE/BSC 
Shigella dysenteriae Fecal specimen no 2 2 0 I SP 





Typhoid fever Fecal specimen, 
Blood, urine, bone 
marrow 
no 2 2/3 0 
P/I SP 
Bacterial Staining 
Buruli ulcer Subculture no 2 3 0 Minimal risk SP 
Meningococcal 
Meningitis 
Subculture yes 2 2 1 
P/A SP/PPE/BSC 




Subculture no 2 2 0 I SP 




Anthrax Swab of lesion, 
whole blood, 
fluids/aspirate, 
tissue, blot clot, 
serum, stool 
yes 2 for non-aerosol; 3 for aerosol and lg quantities 
3 0 
M SP; PPE 
Brucellosis Blood yes     0 
M/A/P SP; PPE 
Buruli ulcer Biopsy, ulcer smear no 2 3 0 Minimal risk SP 





yes 2 2 0 
M/A SP; PPE 
Chikungunya virus Serum no 3 3 0 A SP 
Dengue Tissues, whole blood, 
serum, plasma 





swab, bronco lavage 
fluid, blood 
yes 2 (seasonal); 3 (HPAI or 1918-related work) 
2 (though may be higher for some strains) 
0 
M/A SP; PPE 
Hepatitis Blood no 2 A: 2; B: 
2/3; C: 3; 
D: 3; E: 2/3 
0 










yes 2 2 0 
M SP; PPE 
Polio Virus isolated from 
stool sample 
unknown 2 2 0 
I SP 
Rabies Saliva, cerebrospinal 
fluid, serum 
yes 2 3 0 










M/A SP; PPE 
Yellow Fever Serum/Blood or 
tissue 
no 3 3 0 P SP; PPE 
Serum Agglutination 
Cholera Subculture from 
fecal specimen 





from blood agar 
plate 
yes 2 2 1 
M/A SP; PPE; BSC 
Shigella dysenteriae 
1 
Fresh subculture no 2 2 0 I SP 
Typhoid fever Subculture on 
nonselective agar 
no 2 2/3 0 
P/I SP 
Neutralization Test 
Polio Viral isolate from 
stool sample 
unknown 2 2 0 
I SP 
Influenza Blood/serum yes 2 (seasonal); 3 (HPAI or 1918-related work) 
2 (though may be higher for some strains) 
1 





from blood agar 
plate 
yes 2 2 1 




Tuberculosis Slant Culture yes 2 for non-aerosol; 3 for aerosol and lg quantities 
3 1 





Subculture yes 2 2 1 
M/A SP; PPE; BSC 
Antimicrobial 
Susceptibility 
Tuberculosis Deep chest sputum yes 2 for non-aerosol; 3 for aerosol and lg quantities 
3 1 
A SP; PPE; BSC 
Line Probe Assay 
Tuberculosis Deep chest sputum yes 2 for non-aerosol; 3 for aerosol and lg quantities 
3 1 
A SP; PPE; BSC 
Niacin Test 
Tuberculosis Deep chest sputum yes 2 for non-aerosol; 3 for aerosol and lg quantities 
3 1 
A SP; PPE; BSC 
Nitrate Reduction 
Test 
Tuberculosis 4 week old culture yes 2 for non-aerosol; 3 for aerosol and lg quantities 
3 1 
A SP; PPE; BSC 
Gene XPERT 
Tuberculosis Deep chest sputum yes 2 for non-aerosol; 3 for aerosol and lg quantities 
3 1 




Table 4d: Risks at laboratory service level 4 by platform  
The table below uses the following standard abbreviations: 
P = parenteral; M = mucosal; I = ingestion; A = aerosol; PPE = personal protective equipment; BSC = biosafety cabinet; SP = standard precautions 
Table 4d Service Level 4               





Group Score Risk Mitigation 
Immunohistochemistry 
Anthrax Pleural effusion, 
bronchial biopsy, 
lesion biopsy 
yes 2 for non-aerosol; 3 for aerosol and lg quantities 
3 1 
M/A SP; PPE; BSC 
Buruli ulcer Biopsy no 2 3 0 Minimal 
risk SP 
Crimean Congo Tissue or skin biopsy 
from fatal cases 
unlikely 4 4 1 
M/A SP; PPE; BSC; centrifuge safety 
Dengue Tissue no 2 1 (Aus.) - 3 (Euro/UK) 0 P SP; PPE 
Ebola Skin or tissue 
specimens from fatal 
cases 
possibly 4 4 1 
P/M/A - 
HIGH SP; PPE; BSC 
Lassa Fever Tissue or skin biopsy 
from fatal cases 
yes 4 4 1 P/M/A - 
HIGH SP; PPE; BSC 
Marburg Tissue biopsy possibly 4 4 1 P/M/A - 
HIGH SP; PPE; BSC 
Rift Valley Fever Tissue biopsy yes 3 3 1 P/M/A SP; PPE; BSC 
West Nile Fever Tissue biopsy no 2 (3 for 
bird 
dissection) 
3 0 Minimal exposure to potential 
transmission routes w/ universal 
precautions 
Yellow Fever Post-mortem tissue no 3 3 0 P SP; PPE 
ELISA 
Crimean Congo Whole blood, serum, 
plasma 
unlikely 4 4 1 
M/A SP; PPE; BSC; centrifuge safety 
Ebola Whole blood, serum, 
or plasma 
possibly 4 4 1 
M/A SP; PPE; BSC; centrifuge safety 
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Lassa Fever Whole, blood, serum 
and plasma 
yes 4 4 1 P/M/A - 
HIGH SP; PPE; BSC 
Marburg Whole blood, blood 
clot, serum, or 
plasma 
possibly 4 4 1 P/M/A - 
HIGH SP; PPE; BSC 
Rift Valley Fever Whole blood, serum, 
plasma, blood clot, 
or tissue 
yes 3 3 1 
P/M/A - 
HIGH SP; PPE; BSC 
West Nile Fever Whole blood, serum, 
plasma 




M/A SP; PPE 
Immunofluorescence 
Rabies Skin biopsy 
containing 
cutaneous nerves 
yes 2 3 1 
M/A SP; PPE; centrifuge safety 
RT-PCR 
Crimean Congo Whole blood, blood 
clot, serum/plasma, 
or tissues 
unlikely 4 4 1 
M/A SP; PPE; BSC; centrifuge safety 
Ebola Whole blood, blood 
clot, serum/plasma, 
or tissue 
possibly 4 4 1 
M/A SP; PPE; BSC; centrifuge safety 
Lassa Fever Whole blood, blood 
clot, tissues, serum 
or plasma 
yes 4 4 1 
M/A SP; PPE; BSC; centrifuge safety 
Marburg Whole blood, blood 
clot, serum/plasma, 
or tissue 
possibly 4 4 1 
M/A SP; PPE; BSC; centrifuge safety 
Rift Valley Fever Tissue biopsy, whole 
blood, or blood clot 
yes 3 3 1 
M/A SP; PPE; BSC; centrifuge safety 
Small Pox - RULE 
OUT 
Biopsy specimen, 
scabs, vesicular fluid, 
pustule material, 
blood samples 
yes 4 4 1 
M/A SP; PPE; BSC; centrifuge safety 
West Nile Fever Whole blood, serum, 
tissue biopsy 









Influenza Viral isolates yes 2 (seasonal); 3 (HPAI or 1918-related work) 
2 (though may be higher for some strains) 
1 
M/A SP; PPE; BSC 
Phage Lysis Plague Subculture yes 2 3 0 M/A SP; PPE; BSC 
Viral Isolation 
Chikungunya virus Serum no 3 3 0 
M/A SP; PPE; BSC; centrifuge safety 











yes 2 (seasonal); 3 (HPAI or 1918-related work) 
2 (though may be higher for some strains) 
1 
M/A SP; PPE; BSC; centrifuge safety 
Polio  Stool, pharynx swab unknown 2 2 1 I SP; PPE; BSC 
Rabies Skin biopsy, serum, 
cerebrospinal fluid, 
saliva 
yes 2 3 0 
A/I SP; PPE; BSC 










M/A SP; PPE; BSC; centrifuge safety 
Yellow Fever Serum/Blood no 3 3 0 P SP; PPE; BSC 
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For each of these detailed assay-based risk profiles based on the notional disease list, it is possible to 
generate an aggregated overview of biological risks (see Table 5). 
Table 5. Score risks posed by aggregated pathogen tests at each service level 
 Service 
 Level
 Diagnostic Test  Risk Scores Major exposure 
 risk
 Mitigation Tools
 Infectious  Communicable
 1  Rapid Test  +  +++  P/M  SP
 1/2  Microscopy  ++  +++  P/M  PPE
 2/3  Agglutination  +  ++  P/M  PPE
 2/3  ELISA  ++  ++++  P/M  PPE
 2/3 Bacterial culture and 
 biochemical testing
 ++++  ++++  P/M/A/I  PPE; BSC 
 2/3  PCR/RT-PCR  ++  +++  P/M  PPE
P = parenteral; M = mucosal; A = aerosol; I = ingestion; PPE = personal protective equipment; BSC = biosafety 





General Biorisk Profiles 
 
Based on these aggregated risk profiles, interviews with key stakeholders in the three priority regions, 
and existing biosafety and biosecurity guidance, we developed a set of general biorisk profiles for 
diagnostic laboratories at each level of a tiered, integrated laboratory system that can be used to help 







General Biorisk Profile - Health Service Level I Laboratory 
 
General Overview  
Health Service Level 1 (HSL 1) laboratories are part of the primary health care facilities that handle in- 
and out-patient screening for a community.  Most often the laboratory is a single room used to collect 
patient samples (blood, swabs, sputum, urine, feces) with very limited laboratory equipment and little 
to no engineering controls.  HSL 1 laboratories are limited in their diagnostic capabilities referring the 
majority of patient samples to levels 2-4 for diagnostic testing.    
 
Diagnostic Capabilities 
HSL 1 laboratories have very restricted diagnostic capabilities and are limited to sample collection, rapid 
diagnostic tests, and basic microscopy.  Sample collection requires direct contact with patients who may 
expose laboratory staff to infectious pathogens.  Sample collection methods require contact with blood, 
swabs (nose, throat, nasopharynx, tracheal, wound), urine, feces and possibly skin biopsies.  Risk 
mitigation includes proper sample collection as well as capacities for sample referral and shipment as a 
majority of the diagnostic tests will be performed in level 2 and above. 
 
Staff 
Generally HSL 1 staff consists of laboratory technicians with little to no experience or technical training.  
There is a high level of turnover not only because properly trained staff seek higher paying positions but 
staffing is decided at higher levels across the ministry with little to no input from laboratory managers/ 
directors.   Mitigation efforts can include employment and job placement policies as well as regular and 
mandatory training for staff on proper sample collection (process and transmission-based precautions), 
diagnostics, and sample referral/transport.  SOPs should be developed and accessible to all staff. 
 
Biosafety Risks  
Major biosafety risks involve accidental exposure and/or intentional release during sample collection, 
handling, diagnostics, storage, and/or destruction.  Risk mitigation can be performed through regularly 
scheduled training, providing SOPs for all laboratory activities (sample collection, laboratory 
techniques/diagnostics, sample disinfection/waste management) that are easily accessible to all 
laboratory staff and providing appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) including  gowns, face 




The relative risk is minor.  There is a small amount of unstable pathogen in patient samples collected at 
HSL 1.  There is no risk of pathogen manipulation due to lack of equipment and technical expertise.  Risk 





General Biorisk Profile - Health Service Level 2 Laboratory 
 
General Overview  
Health Service Level 2 (HSL 2) laboratories are part of the district level referral hospitals.  The hospitals 
are small intermediate referral facilities that serve inpatients.  The laboratories have dedicated 
laboratory space and trained personnel.  HSL2 labs provide test menus for diagnoses with multiple 
diagnostic platforms as well as coordinate HSL1 laboratory services.  
 
Diagnostic Capabilities 
HSL2 labs perform multiple diagnostic platforms including microscopy, microbiology culture, serology, 
and biochemical testing.  Consolidating testing at HSL2 leads to the use automated equipment platforms 
as well as coordinate the services of HSL1 laboratories.  Risk mitigation includes proper transmission-
based precautions in handling of samples during isolation, culture and/or isolation. 
 
Staff 
Generally HSL2 staff consists of laboratory specialists and technicians with varying experience and 
technical training.  Staff turnover remains an issue with trained staff seeking higher paying positions as 
well as staffing decisions made at higher levels across the ministry with little to no input from laboratory 
managers/ directors.   Mitigation efforts can include employment and job placement policies as well as 
regular and mandatory training for staff on proper sample collection (process and transmission-based 
precautions), diagnostics, and sample referral/transport.  SOPs should be developed and accessible to all 
staff. 
 
Biosafety Risks  
Major biosafety risks involve accidental exposure and/or intentional release during sample handling, 
diagnostics, storage, and/or destruction.  Risk mitigation can be performed through regularly scheduled 
training, providing SOPs for all activities (laboratory techniques/diagnostics, sample disinfection/waste 
management) that are easily accessible to all laboratory staff and providing appropriate personal 
protective equipment (PPE) including:  gowns, face masks, gloves, and eye goggles.  In addition staff 
should be offered all available vaccines against priority diseases and proper engineering controls should 
be provided for isolation and culture. 
 
Biosecurity Risks 
The relative risk is moderate and lies in pathogen manipulation, culture techniques, and the vulnerability 
of the isolates and cultures.  Risk mitigation can be performed by providing physical security to the 
laboratory space to prevent unauthorized access  
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General Biorisk Profile - Health Service Level 3 Laboratory 
 
General Overview  
Health Service Level 3 (HSL 3) laboratories are regional or provincial laboratories.  The laboratories have 
dedicated space for specimen receipt, laboratory diagnostic testing, engineering controls for limited 
molecular testing, and trained personnel.  HSL3 labs provide extensive test menus for diagnoses with 




HSL3 labs perform multiple diagnostic platforms including microscopy, microbiology culture, serology, 
biochemical testing, and limited molecular techniques, including PCR.  Risk mitigation includes proper 




Generally HSL3 staff consists of laboratory technician and specialists with some laboratory experience 
and technical training.  As with HSL2 staff turnover is an issue with time-limited positions and staffing 
decisions made at higher levels across the ministry with little to no input from laboratory directors.   
Mitigation efforts can include employment and job placement policies as well as regular and mandatory 
training for staff on sample receipt, molecular diagnostics, engineering controls, and hazardous waste 
management.  SOPs should be developed and accessible to all staff. 
 
 
Biosafety Risks  
Similar to HSL2, major biosafety risks involve accidental exposure and/or intentional release during 
sample handling, microbiology culture, molecular diagnostics, storage, and/or destruction.  Risk 
mitigation can be performed through regularly scheduled training, providing SOPs for all activities 
(laboratory techniques/diagnostics, sample disinfection/waste management) that are easily accessible 
to all laboratory staff and providing appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) including:  gowns, 
face masks, gloves, and eye goggles.  In addition staff should be offered all available vaccines against 




The relative risk is moderate and lies in the vulnerability of the isolates and cultures particularly with 
pathogen manipulation and culture.   Risk mitigation can be performed by providing physical security to 




General Biorisk Profile - Health Service Level 4 Laboratory 
 
General Overview  
Health Service Level 4 (HSL 4) laboratories are national or multi-country reference laboratories.  These 
laboratories are WHO testing laboratories that handle and store controlled pathogens.  The laboratories 
have dedicated space for specimen receipt, laboratory diagnostic testing, engineering controls for 
molecular testing, and trained personnel.  HSL4 labs provide a complete menu of confirmatory tests 
including qualitative and quantitative nucleic acid testing and antimicrobial resistance.  HSL4 labs 
coordinate laboratory services for the entire country or for multiple countries.  
 
Diagnostic Capabilities 
HSL4 labs perform a complete menu of diagnostic platforms including microbiology culture, serology, 
biochemical testing, molecular techniques, and antimicrobial resistance testing.  Risk mitigation includes 
proper transmission-based precautions in handling of samples during isolation, diagnostics, and 
destruction as well as proper training and PPE to prevent exposure to aerosols/droplets from culture 
manipulation.   
 
Staff 
HSL4 laboratories have senior laboratory specialists, laboratory specialists and assistants on staff.  
Training is crucial to retaining qualified staff.  It is important to maintain scheduled, regular training for 
molecular diagnostics, standard precautions and transmission-based risks, biorisk assessment and 
mitigation, engineering controls including biosafety cabinets, laboratory equipment maintenance, and 
biohazardous waste management.  SOPs and training should be regularly scheduled and accessible to all 
staff. 
 
Biosafety Risks  
Similar to HSL2 and HSL3, major biosafety risks involve accidental exposure and/or intentional release 
during sample handling, culture, molecular diagnostics, storage, and/or destruction.  Risk mitigation can 
be performed through regularly scheduled training, providing SOPs for all activities (laboratory 
techniques/diagnostics, sample disinfection/waste management) that are easily accessible to all 
laboratory staff and providing appropriate PPE including:  gowns, face masks, gloves, and eye goggles.  
In addition staff should be offered all available vaccines against priority diseases and proper engineering 
controls should be provided for isolation and culture. 
 
Biosecurity Risks 
The relative risk is moderate to high and lies in the vulnerability of the isolates and cultures to theft or 
diversion.   Risk mitigation can be performed by providing physical security to the laboratory space 
including access controls, personnel surety, and an archiving strategy for specimens and isolates.  The 




Under IHR (2005), States Parties are required to develop core capabilities to detect and respond to 
potential public health emergencies of international concern. To model risk management under this 
framework, we employed a classical risk management equation:  
 
Risk – Controls = Residual risk (Eq. 1) 
 
In this context, the overall intent of laboratory biorisk management (LBR) under IHR (2005) is to develop 
functional capacities that reduce health security risks to a level (residual risk) that is acceptable to health 
workers at the facility level and to the international community. In this model, risk refers to existing risks 
to global health security (GHSR); controls refer to the attributes under Laboratory in the IHR (2005) Core 
Capacities Monitoring Framework (IHR CC); and residual risk (RR) refers to the risks remaining after full 
implementation of the laboratory biosafety/biosecurity attributes described in the IHR Monitoring 
Framework (implemented through practices or standards described in documents such as CWA 
15793:2011 or the US BMBL).  The equation that best describes the relationship between global health 
security risks and the standards encapsulated in the IHR CC Monitoring Framework is:  
 
GHSR – IHR CC + LBR = RR (Eq. 2) 
 
Ideally, the IHR CC will fully offset the initial GHSR.  If we rearrange equation 2 and assume that IHR CC = 
GHSR, we obtain:  
GHSR + LBR = RR + IHR CC (Eq. 3) 
 
Although it is unlikely that the initial global health security will reach 0, Eq. 3 demonstrates the 
contribution of unmitigated laboratory biological risk to residual risk and underscores the importance of 
appropriate biological risk mitigation when developing laboratory capacity.  
 
As national clinical laboratory systems are strengthened worldwide to improve abilities to detect, assess, 
report, and respond rapidly to biological events in accordance with the core capacity requirements 
under IHR (2005), policy-makers and public health officials must plan to manage novel biological risks 
that may be created by expanding diagnostic capacities for priority diseases. Clinical and public health 
laboratories function differently than research and industrial facilities, creating different working 
environments, pressures, and cultural norms.  
While research laboratory workers generally work with pre-identified biological agents, and thus may 
avail themselves of existing guidance on handling hazardous materials (assuming awareness of and 
access to such resources), diagnostic laboratory workers frequently handle patient specimens containing 
unknown pathogens. Although the quantities of these pathogens may be small and impure, the inherent 
biological risk posed by any individual sample may not be known until after extensive testing has 
identified the disease-causing organism. Research laboratories tend to be built on traditional 
hierarchies, with a primary investigator guiding the laboratory intellectually (but not necessarily at the 
bench) while more senior trainees and professional technicians directly supervise early career trainees, 
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all motivated by professional development incentives that include publications and acquisition of 
continuing funding.  In contrast, clinical and public health laboratories tend to be staffed by salaried 
laboratory technicians and technologists, driven by the need to support rapid clinical decision-making 
reliably and cost effectively (often through fee-for-service financing).  Laboratory and public health 
stakeholders interviewed directly by the research team in priority regions (including Southeast Asia, the 
Middle East and North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa) report high staff turnover, especially among 
health facilities in rural or underserved geographic areas, as laboratory professionals advance their 
careers or seek better amenities by moving among government public health/clinical laboratories or 
from the public to the private sector.   
In low- and middle-income countries, laboratory worker protections (including vaccinations, access to 
health services and prophylactic countermeasures, adequate PPE, functional biosafety cabinets, and – 
above all – training) may be uneven at best.  However, the gold standard of testing for most diseases 
and conditions identified as high priority at the national, regional, and global levels depends upon timely 
and reliable laboratory testing.  Despite aspirations of skipping the “wet lab” for testing based purely on 
rapid diagnostic testing or molecular diagnostics using minute samples, national health systems still 
need adequate laboratory services, particularly at the first formal levels of health services where 
patients with priority diseases are likely to present, and robust systems for transporting specimens to 
reference laboratories for confirmatory testing.     
Following standards- and transmission-based precautions is key for reducing the risks of laboratory 
acquired infections.  Internationally accepted biorisk management frameworks (such as the US BMBL, 
WHO, and European biosafety scoring systems) provide quick frames of reference to the general risks 
posed by pathogens. However, much of the guidance developed to help implement these systems 
derives from systems designed for research and industrial laboratories that conduct high-risk operations 
with known pathogens, with support at the facility level. Additionally, many laboratory risk assessment 
tools measure risk at the level of the individual, not the community.   
External partners in capacity-building projects often apply the standards used domestically in their own 
countries (for example, the BMBL standards for biosafety levels 1 -4) when supporting capacity-building 
to enhance laboratory biosafety and biosecurity with partner nations, including for diagnostic 
laboratories. The practice-based physical infrastructure and engineering controls adopted under these 
standards are often expensive to maintain, and ultimately not sustainable in low-resource countries. 
Substandard and under-maintained biosafety equipment poses a significant danger to workers and the 
community at large. 
Our approach demonstrates the proof of concept that laboratory biosafety and biosecurity risks can be 
predicted, and planning and budgeting to mitigate such risks sustainably can be included in capacity-
building strategies.  For each pathogen designated as a priority disease at the national, regional, or 
global level, practical steps can be used to: 
• Identify “gold standard” diagnostic algorithms for each priority pathogen; 
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• Determine most appropriate tests at each health systems level (e.g., district, provincial, 
national); 
• Characterize the risks created by each pathogen in the context of specific diagnostic platforms;  
• Identify biological risks and strategies for mitigation; 
• Develop a general biorisk profile that can be used in planning for laboratory capacity building; 
and 
• Develop a costing strategy for biological risk management that can be used across national 
laboratory systems. 
 
Planning and budgeting for laboratory biological risk mitigation strategies can be strengthened using this 
systematic approach, and by applying nuanced approaches that consider costs and benefits in the 
context of the risks most likely to be encountered by appropriately equipped diagnostic laboratories 




Appendix 1: Regional Priority Diseases 
National and regional priority diseases: sub-Saharan Africa 
 In 1998, the Member States of the WHO Regional Committee for Africa adopted a regional Integrated 
Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) strategy under resolution AFR/RC48/R2 to strengthen 
surveillance for and response to the diseases that cause disability and death throughout the African 
region.  In 2006, the WHO Regional Office for Africa declared “application of the IHRs (2005) in the 
African Region will proceed in the context of the Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) 
strategy that the WHO Regional Committee for Africa adopted in 1998.”28  The majority of countries in 
the region (43 of 46) adopted the IDSR strategy, and WHO/AFRO worked with partner organizations 
such as the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) to support implementation at every level of their health systems.  In 2010, 
WHO/AFRO and CDC worked together to update IDSR technical guidance, expanding the scope of the 
tools to reflect IHR reporting requirements.  The 2010 technical guidance includes a list of IHR/IDSR-
relevant diseases, conditions, and events that countries are expected to adapt for their own use, 
according to national priorities and disease burden.29  Table 2 lists the infectious diseases included in 
this guidance by category.  (Although the technical guidance also included non-communicable diseases 
among these priority notifiable diseases for the first time, these do not appear immediately relevant to 
IHR reporting requirements. Also excluded are syndromes based on case definitions without laboratory 





Priority diseases, conditions, and events for Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response in the WHO African 
Region – 2010 
Epidemic prone 
diseases 
Diseases targeted for 
eradication or 
elimination 
Other major diseases, 
events or conditions of 
public health 
importance 





Marburg, Rift Valley, 
Lassa, Crimean Congo, 
























Acute viral hepatitis 








Human influenza due 
to a new subtype* 
SARS* 
Smallpox* 
Any public health event 
of international or 
national concern 
(infectious, zoonotic, 
food borne, chemical, 
radio nuclear, or 
due to unknown 
condition)* 
 
*Always notifiable or high-risk diseases under IHR (2005) 
 
Because this regional strategy has been adopted by the majority of sub-Saharan African countries, the 
IDSR priority disease list serves as a regional representation of the priority diseases, conditions, and 
events for which national laboratory systems must develop diagnostic and confirmatory testing 
capabilities under IHR (2005) in the WHO/AFRO region.  Although some of the major diseases identified 
as regional priorities would not necessarily be reportable as PHEICs, they generally share diagnostic 
testing platforms with high-risk, epidemic-prone diseases that occur less frequently, and thus can be 
considered proxy diseases for laboratory testing and reporting capabilities.     
National and regional priority diseases: Southeast Asia   
The Member States of the WHO regional offices representing South and Southeast Asia and the Western 
Pacific (SEARO and WPRO, respectively) agreed in 2005 to adopt a shared strategic framework for 
building regional capacities for public health security.  The Asia Pacific Strategy for Emerging Diseases 
(APSED), updated in 2010 to reflect IHR requirements as well as national capacity-building experiences, 
outlines strategic actions for national decision makers to consider in building IHR (2005) core capacities 
to detect, report, and respond to public health events.30  
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The Asia Pacific Strategy for Strengthening of Health Laboratory Services (2010–2015) provides a 
framework for laboratory assessments and capacity-building, but did not specifically list priority diseases 
for the region.31  Table 3 lists national priority diseases for six nations representing the spectrum of 
economic development levels in Southeast Asia, along with the list of reportable diseases selected for 
reciprocal reporting by the six participating states of the sub-regional Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance 
cross-border network (Cambodia, Yunan and Guangxi provinces in China, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, 
and Vietnam).  Diseases designated as reportable among 5 or more of the 7 lists are highlighted in blue.1  
Based on the frequency with which these diseases appear on nationally notifiable disease lists, and 
given that most countries in the region share numerous risk factors for disease outbreaks, these 
highlighted diseases serve as a representative sample of priority diseases, conditions, and events for 
which national laboratory systems must develop diagnostic and confirmatory testing capabilities in 
Southeast Asia. 
                                                          
1 As for sub-Saharan Africa, the list excludes syndromes based on case definitions without laboratory confirmation 
(e.g., diarrhea and tetanus). 
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Priority diseases in case study countries of Southeast Asia 












































































































severe adverse events 
following immunization 
acute severe illness/death 
from unknown infection 






























































*Plus 50 additional diseases not requiring immediate reporting 
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National and regional priority diseases: Middle East/North Africa (MENA) 
Although the WHO Regional Committee for the Eastern Mediterranean agreed to a regional framework 
for integrated disease surveillance and response more than 20 years ago, the Member States of the 
WHO Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office (WHO/EMRO) – which overlaps significantly with U.S. 
agency MENA designations – have not yet developed a regional implementation strategy.32  In lieu of 
shared regional templates or protocols, WHO/EMRO has identified “visions” for controlling 
communicable diseases in the region, specifically targeting diseases that continue to take a toll in the 
countries that face resource constraints and ongoing challenges to stability and governance.  This 
includes strengthening systems to prevent and detect endemic diseases that include tuberculosis, 
lymphatic filariasis, leprosy, dracunculiasis, malaria, schistosomiasis, leishmaniasis, ochocerciasis, 
trypanosomiasis, and maternal and neonatal tetanus, as well as vaccine-preventable diseases such as 
measles and polio.33  Hepatitis and diarrheal disease caused by food- and water-borne illnesses continue 
to cause significant morbidity in these countries.  In the last two decades, both developed and 
developing nations in the region have experienced zoonotic and emerging infectious disease outbreaks 
caused by viral hemorrhagic fevers, dengue fever, brucellosis, highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza, 
and the novel Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) coronavirus.34 
In response to these threats and to IHR reporting requirements, many countries in the MENA region 
have updated their national priority disease lists since 2005.  Table 4 compares reportable diseases from 
three countries in the region: Egypt, Jordan, and Oman.  Diseases are organized by immediacy of 
reporting requirements (immediately notifiable diseases, or those that must be reported within 24 
hours, and those that must be reported either weekly or monthly).  Diseases prioritized for reporting by 
all three countries, regardless of reporting immediacy, are highlighted. 
Although this combined list does not necessarily represent a consensus for the entire region, it reflects 
shared priorities among countries with differing demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.  
Notifiable diseases that appear on all three lists served as a representative sample of priority diseases 




Priority diseases in case study countries of the Middle East/North Africa 











Acute Flaccid Paralysis/ 
Poliomyelitis 
Acute Flaccid Paralysis 
(AFP) 
Poliomyelitis 
Acute Flaccid Paralysis 
(AFP) 
HIV/AIDS HIV/AIDS   
Rabies Rabies Rabies 
Diphtheria Diphtheria  
Meningitis Meningococcal disease  Meningococcal infection 
Plague Plague  Plague 
Tetanus (Neonatal) Neonatal tetanus  
Acute Food Poisoning Food poisoning Food poisoning 
Unusually Severe Health Events: 
Botulism 
Viral hemorrhagic fever 




Unexpected or unusual 
diseases or events 
Viral hemorrhagic fever 
 
Cholera 
Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) 
Acute hemorrhagic fever 
syndrome 
Cholera 
Encephalitis  Haemophilus meningitis 





Malaria   
 Suspected measles Fever and rash-like illness 
 Yellow fever Yellow fever 















Typhoid Typhoid & paratyphoid Typhoid & paratyphoid 
fever 
Brucellosis Brucellosis Brucellosis (human) 
Bloody diarrhea (dysentery) Bloody diarrhea  
Acute Hepatitis Viral hepatitis 
 
Acute viral hepatitis 
Animal bite Animal bite  
Fascioliasis Chicken pox Chicken pox 
Mumps  Mumps 
Pertussis  Pertussis 
Rubella   
Schistosomiasis Bilharziasis Schistosomiasis 
Tuberculosis Tuberculosis Tuberculosis 
Filariasis Cutaneous leishmaniasis Leishmaniasis 
Leprosy Diarrheas Acute watery diarrhea 
(childhood) 
Measles Hydatid cysts  
 Malaria  




 Tetanus Active trachoma 
 Viral meningitis Meningitis (other than Hib 
and Nm) 
 Adverse Events Following 
Immunization 




LRTI and pneumonia 
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Appendix 2: Infection Control and Biosafety Guidelines  
Author Year Title/Subject Description 
Infection Control and Prevention 
    
WHO 2014 Infection prevention and control of 
epidemic- and pandemic-prone acute 
respiratory infections in health care 
IPC guidelines for acute respiratory infections, including 
those that might constitute a public health emergency of 
international concern 
WHO Global IPC Network 2011 Tools for regional/national adaptation 1.  IPC guidance for epidemic-prone infections 
2.  Implementation Tools 
3.  Generic IPC curricula for training of IPC professionals 
4.  Key IPC indicators for national and healthcare facility 
levels 
5.  Inventory of existing IPC national and international 
guidelines 
WHO 2008 Interim Infection Control 
Recommendations for Care of Patients 
with Suspected or Confirmed Filovirus 
IPC guidelines for Ebola and Marburg virus patients 
WHO 2007 Standard Precautions in Patient Care  
WHO  Ethical Issues in Patient Safety Antimicrobial resistance 
US CDC 1996-
present 
Healthcare Infection Control Practices 
Advisory Committee 
1. HICPAC Guidelines (1996) 
2.  Guideline for infection control in hospital personnel 
(1998) 
3.  Guidelines for environmental infection control in 
health-care facilities (2007) 
4.  Guideline for isolation precautions (2007) 
5.  Guideline for disinfection and sterilization in 





Laboratory biosafety  
WHO 2004 Laboratory Biosafety Manual – 3rd Edition -Practical guidance on biosafety 
techniques for clinical laboratories 
-Available in multiple languages 
http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/WHO_CDS_CSR_LYO
_2004_11/en/ 
U.S. NIH and 
CDC 
2009 Biosafety in Microbiological and 
Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) – 5th 
Edition 
Biosafety and biosecurity guidelines for research and diagnostic laboratories 
http://www.cdc.gov/biosafety/publications/bmbl5/ 
CDC 2012 
Guidelines for Safe Work Practices in 
Human and Animal Medical Diagnostic 
Laboratories Recommendations of a CDC-
convened, Biosafety Blue Ribbon Panel  




2008 Biosafety Europe-Final Considerations:  
coordination, harmonization, and 
exchange of biosafety and biosecurity 
practices within a pan-European network 










2011 CWA 15793 Process-based standard and implementation  





827a-0716f524babc/Resources/Guidelines and Standards/Biorisk 




CWA 153 Standards for professional biosafety training 
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Appendix 3: Natural Modes of Transmission 
Disease Pathogen Potential Routes of Transmission Vaccine 
Aerosol Mucosal 
Membrane 
Ingestion Parenteral  
Anthrax Bacillus anthracis X X X X Yes 
Brucellosis Brucella spp. X X X X No 
Buruli ulcer Mycobacterium ulcerans U X X X No 
Chikungunya Chikungunya virus X   X No 
Cholera Vibrio cholera X  X  No 
Crimean Congo 
Crimean Congo 
Hemorrhagic Fever virus 
X X  X No 
Dengue Dengue virus U X  X No 
Diphtheria Corynebacterium diphtheria X X X X Yes 
Ebola virus 
disease 
Ebola virus U X  X No 
Hepatitis A & E Hepatitis A & E virus   X X Yes/No 
Hepatitis B, C, & D Hepatitis B, C, & D virus  X  X Yes/No/Ind. 
HIV HIV  X  X No 
Influenza Influenza virus X X   Yes 
Japanese 
Encephalitis  
Japanese encephalitis virus X X  X Yes 
Lassa Fever Lassa fever virus X X X X No 
Leprosy Mycobacterium leprae U X X X No 
Lymphatic 
filariasis 
Wuchereria bancrofti  / 
Brugia malayi   
X X No 
Malaria Plasmodium falciparum    X No 
Marburg fever Marburg Virus U X  X No 
Measles Measles virus X X  X Yes 
Meningococcal 
meningitis 
Neisseria meningitidis X X X X Yes 
MERS  MERS Co-V X X  X No 
Onchocerciasis Onchocerca volvulus    X No 
Plague Yersinia pestis X X X X No 
Polio Poliovirus X  X X Yes 
Rabies Rabies virus X X  X Yes 
Rift Valley fever Rift Valley fever virus X X  X Not for humans 
SARS SARS Co-V X X   No 
Shigella Shigella dysenteriae  U X X X No 
Trypanosomiasis Trypanosoma spp.    X No 
Tuberculosis Mycobacterium tuberculosis X X X X Yes, limit efficacy 
Typhoid Salmonella typhi U X X X Yes 
West Nile Fever West Nile Fever virus X X  X No 
Yellow Fever Yellow fever virus X X  X Yes 
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Appendix 4: Development of an Epidemiologic Model for Community Risk Posed 
by Development of Clinical Laboratory Capability 
The calculations in the main body of this report (above) represent a semi-quantitative scale for depicting 
risk based on existing biosafety frameworks and references.  However, as part of this study, we tested 
the proof of concept that biological risk could be estimated quantitatively to give a numerical score, with 
the goal of allowing decision-makers to perceive relative risk rapidly.   
 
To develop a quantitative model for laboratory biological risk that assesses the overall community risk or 
health security risk incurred by specific manipulations on specific pathogen samples, we employed a 
classical risk assessment relationship: 
 
R=f (T, V, A)   (Eq. 4.1) 
Wherein risk (R) is a probability that a threat (T) will exploit a vulnerability (V) to cause harm to an asset 
(A).  Calculation of T, V, and A will enable us to assess the risk of a pathogen to cause serious infection as 
the result of an occupational manipulation, and the potential danger of the pathogen to the community 
at large.  
 
Threat (T) of a pathogen: the likelihood that a pathogen will be transmitted to a worker during a 
given manipulation or procedure. 
Vulnerability (V) of the subject: the impact of the pathogen or disease on an exposed subject 
Asset (A): the degree to which the pathogen impacts the community at large 
 
T, V, and A are approximated by epidemiologic parameters, as described below, and Risk is calculated as 
the product of all variables.   
 
Risk = T x V x A  (Eq. 4.2) 
 
In this model, V is measured by the severity of disease caused by a pathogen. To approximate V, we 
employed the average case fatality rate (CFR), which is defined as the proportion of people with a 
specific condition who die as a result of that condition (or the number of deaths from a specific disease 
over the number of cases of disease within a given time frame).38  Because values for CFR are a 
proportion or ratio, they can range from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating disease that is certain to result in 
death. For our analysis, V values are therefore constant for a specific pathogen and independent of how 
the sample is handled or manipulated. For pathogens that do not generally cause mortality, we estimate 
V as 0.01. V represents an average vulnerability and does not make assumptions about risk factors such 
as patient immune status, which would impact the vulnerability of a patient. Moreover, V assumes that 
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no medical countermeasures or vaccines are applied.2 We display V values for priority pathogens in 
Table 4.1. 
 
A represents the average number of cases likely to result if an individual becomes infected with a 
communicable disease and transmits that disease to others.  We approximate this value using the basic 
reproductive rate (R0), or the expected number of secondary cases of an infectious disease resulting 
from an index case in a completely susceptible population.39  Using R0 enables us to quantitate the 
potential for a pathogen to cause an outbreak and measures the magnitude of a potential health 
security threat to the community at large. Because the index case, or original individual infected is also 
considered an asset in our model, A= R0. + 1. In cases where pathogens are not transmitted naturally 
from person to person, but require an intermediate host, such as a mosquito, we estimated R0  = 1, a 
value that assumes an intermediate host density.40 Of note, for water-borne diseases, in countries with 
treated water supplies, R0 would likely be lower than published values, leading to lower A values than in 
Table 4.1.  
 
As with V, A is pathogen-specific variable and constant throughout our analysis. Both variables are listed 
in Table 4.1.  Mitigation of epidemic potential of any pathogen can be reduced by provision of vaccines 
to the population at large,41 or by post-exposure administration of medical countermeasures such as 
anti-microbial drugs.  When available, medical countermeasures can provide significant post-exposure 
protection and significantly reduce A values.  
While A and V are epidemiologic parameters that remain constant for each pathogen, T is a function of 
the hazard posed by sample manipulation processes (M) (for example, sample collection or diagnostic 
testing activities) and the ability of a pathogen within a given sample to cause infection (I). In a 
laboratory setting, workers may be exposed to pathogens through routes other than the normal routes 
of pathogen infectivity: aerosol, mucous membrane or cutaneous exposure (mucocutaneous), insect 
bite, or ingestion.  In addition, laboratory workers may be exposed to larger amounts of pathogen than 
general encountered during transmission of illness in a community setting.  For example, inhalation of 
large quantities of a virus usually transmitted by insect vectors can result in infection via  
mucocutaneous or aerosol routes.42 Therefore, the value for T accounts for the likelihood that exposure 
will result from a given manipulation during one of several stages of laboratory assessment, and the 
likelihood that an exposure will result in infection of laboratory personnel.  
In this model, T is approximated as a product of the manipulation hazard (M) and the likelihood that an 
exposure will cause infection (I). 
T = M x I (Eq. 4.3) 
                                                          
2 Administration of vaccines or medical countermeasures to laboratory workers significant reduces vulnerability 
and thereby decreases overall risk. 
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As diagrammed in Figure 2, various stages of a laboratory system necessitate different occupational 
manipulations by workers that will introduce different likelihoods of exposure to dangerous pathogens.  
Manipulations can lead to exposure via percutaneous, mucocutaneous, and aerosol routes. The 
manipulation hazard associated with a specific procedure, Mprocedure, depends upon the specific 
manipulation of a pathogenic sample and is unique for different laboratory-related processes. Notably, 
intentional exposure has occurred in clinical laboratories but because the incidents are quite rare, it 
represents a negligible manipulation hazard for laboratory biological risk. Using prospective data, 
several investigators have assessed relative rates of injury associated with specific occupations. Based 
on these rates, we developed procedure-specific manipulation values for sample collection and 
laboratory diagnostic procedures of clinical laboratory systems. 
The ability of a pathogen to cause infection depends on multiple factors, including the infectious dose of 
a pathogen, the concentration of the pathogen within the sample, and the physical parameters of the 
sample that impact transmission. Because of the paucity and ethical constraints in determining data on 
infectious dose in human populations, in addition to wide ranges for presumed pathogen 
concentrations, and unpredictable differences in physical specimen parameters, it is impossible to 
empirically calculate I accurately for all pathogens. I can be approximated by epidemiologic constants for 
exposure-associated attack rates for specific pathogens and different working conditions. However, 
because attack rates are influenced by several factors including prevalence of disease, workload, specific 
occupation, etc., rates would ideally be calculated in member countries. For our analysis, we have 
conducted a literature review for exposure associated attack rates (E) for infectious diseases among 
laboratory workers. Because data is compiled prospectively and exposed worker data (denominator) is 
not consistent across studies, the values are only estimates used to illustrate the model. Data from 
historical studies43,44 is normalized and displayed in Table 4.1. In cases where no data for E is available, 
we estimate E based on attack rates for similar pathogens; estimated values are denoted by italics in the 
table. E values are specific for each pathogen and remain constant throughout our analysis.   
Therefore in our analysis, I is approximated by E, and equation 6 becomes:  
T=Mprocedure x Epathogen  (Eq. 4.4) 
To estimate the overall risk posed by accidental release of a pathogen during routine laboratory 
processes, our R score is defined as the product of:  
Risk = Mprocedure (exposure) x E (exposure-associated attack rate) x V (case fatality) x A (R0+1) 
 (Eq. 4.5)  
In our analysis, Risk is measured in units of deaths –year. The numerical values for risk enable one to 





Table 4.1:  Pathogen-specific values for V, A, I – examples 
Pathogen Disease V A I 
Bacillus anthracis Anthrax 0.2 1 0.012 
Brucella spp. Brucellosis 0.02 1 0.18 
Mycobacterium ulcerans Buruli ulcer 0.01 1 0.05 
Vibrio cholera Cholera 0.01 3.6 0.05 
Chikungunya virus Chikungunya 
fever 
0.01 2 0.05 
Crimean Congo virus Crimean Congo 
hemorrhagic 
fever 
0.3 2 0.6 
Dengue virus Dengue 
(hemorrhagic) 
fever 
0.01 1 0.05 
Corynebacterium Diptheria 0.07 7.5 0.6 
Ebola virus Ebola virus 
disease 
0.85 1 0.65 
Human Immunodeficiency 
virus 
HIV/AIDS 0.85 2 0.03 
Influenza virus Influenza 0.5 3.5 0.45 
Lassa Fever virus Lassa Fever 0.5 1 0.65 
Mycobacterium leprae Leprosy 0.01 1 0.06 




0.01 1 0.05 
Plasmodium falciparum Malaria 0.2 1 0.05 
Yersinia pestis Plague 0.6 3 0.45 
Marburg virus Marburg 
hemorrhagic 
fever 
0.8 2.6 0.65 
Measles virus Measles 0.1 15 0.65 
Neisseria meningitidis Meningitis 0.11 2.3 0.11 
Poliovirus Polio 0.1 1 0.05 
Yersinia pestis Plague 0.7 2.3 0.45 
Rabies virus Rabies 0.99 1 0.5 
SARS coronavirus SARS 0.4 4.5 0.65 
Shigella dysenteriae  Shigella 0.08 2.3 0.65 
Trypanosoma spp. Trypanosomiasis 1 1 0.05 




Tuberculosis 0.3 7 0.6 





0.6 2 0.05 
Yellow Fever virus Yellow Fever 0.2 2 0.05 
Rift Valley Fever virus Rift Valley Fever 0.7 1 0.65 
 
Calculating risk for sample collection  
To apply this model, we calculated overall risks for sample collection and diagnostic testing of priority 
pathogens. With values for I, A, and V as constants, this required calculation of procedure-specific 
manipulation hazards. For whole blood, CSF, pleural fluid, and bone marrow, the specimen is collected 
via syringe directly into a sealed tube, posing a risk of parenteral inoculation. Swab specimens can be 
taken from a skin lesion or wound exudate, nose, throat, nasopharynx, trachea, and tissue. The primary 
risk involved with this method of collection includes exposure to the laboratory worker’s epithelium 
(mucous membranes and/or intact or non-intact skin).  Biopsies and some skin samples require a skin 
punch and pose a potential risk of parenteral exposure due to injection of local anesthesia, use of a 
scalpel or blade to incise the skin sample, and suture needle to close larger biopsy sites. Due to risks of 
contact with skin and spray into eyes, biopsy also poses a risk for mucocutaneous exposure. Collection 
cups are used for urine, stool, and sputum samples and pose a primary risk of mucocutaneous exposure. 
Furthermore, workers tasked with assisting in collecting sputum samples have been shown to have 
higher rates of exposure, presumable due to aerosol exposure. Phlebotomists, technologists, and nurses 
responsible for sample collection are also exposed to patients and are therefore likely to acquire disease 
via human-human transmission. While this risk is significant, for the purposes of this assessment, we do 
not include the risk of person-person transmission in our analysis for sample collection. Manipulation 
values (M) enable quantitation of specific occupational hazards associated with laboratory duties. 
Importantly, M values can be significantly reduced upon application of standard and transmission based 
procedures that minimize the likelihood of exposure to dangerous pathogens. 
To approximate values for Msample collection, we calculated manipulation hazards posed by sample collection 
procedures (Tables 4.2 a-c). We reviewed data on prospective studies analyzing blood and body fluid 
exposure in workers responsible for clinical sample collection to determine relative risks posed by 
common manipulations. Risks posed by sample collection include risk of exposure via parenteral, 
mucocutaneous, and aerosol routes. Parenteral transmission (i.e., sharps injuries such as needle sticks 
and accidents that occur while biopsying samples) pose the largest risk for accidental infection. 
Mucocutaneous exposure, or exposure via vulnerable epithelial surfaces such as mucous membranes or 
skin, represents another significant route of entry. In cases where samples are collected in a non-sealed 
vessel or workers are exposed to droplets from patients due to the sample collection procedure, 
aerosolization also represents a risk. Although several studies have been conducted to assess health 
care worker exposure to blood and body fluids, we used exposure risks derived from study of healthcare 
workers in the Duke University healthcare system.45  This study analyzed a large population and 
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stratified risks for exposure to blood and body fluids by work function (e.g. sample collection and 
diagnostics). Based on this data, we were able to surmise values for percutaneous and mucocutaneous 
exposure. Although specific data on aerosol exposure was not determined presumably due to difficulties 
in identifying aerosol exposure post-facto, we estimated exposure risks for percutaneous, 
mucocutaneous and aerosol exposure for laboratory workers.  Probabilities for exposure via each route 
are provided below, with overall manipulation hazards determined by adding probabilities of infection 
via different routes. Of note, although we have been able to estimate manipulation hazards, a 
comprehensive prospective study on injury rates for those collecting patient samples would provide 
more accurate information. As shown, the highest threat was posed by pathogens collected by biopsy as 
that entails use of sharps as well as potential aerosol and mucocutaneous exposure, with phlebotomy 
also causing high risk due to the inherent danger of self-injection.  
Table 4.2a 
Mucus Membrane (M) 0.4 
Aerosol (A) 0.4 
Parenteral (P) 0.92 
 
Table 4.2b 
Syringe P 0.92 
Collection 
Cup A, M 0.8 
Biopsy P, A, M 1.0 
Swab A, M 0.8 
 
Table 4.2c 








Syringe X     .091 0.96 
Swab   X x .008 0.8 
Collection cup   X x .008 0.8 
Biopsy X x x .099 1 
Rate/FTE/Year .091 0.004 0.004    
 .096 .003 .003   
Abbreviations:  FTE (full time employee equivalent); P (percutaneous); M (mucocutaneous); A (asset) 
 
Having estimated the values for each of our parameters, we used Equation 8 to calculate the laboratory 
biological risk score for each specimen of each pathogen and averaged the specimen scores for each 
pathogen.   
These scores do not reflect the use of vaccines or medical countermeasures that would reduce the risk 
scores for many pathogens.  Additionally, they do not assume strict adherence to standard and 
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transmission-based precautions, which are critical factors in reducing biological risk. Laboratory-
acquired infections have been attributed to needle sticks, other sharps injuries, not wearing gloves, not 
sanitizing the outside of specimen or culture containers, etc. Several studies have assessed the impact of 
standard protocols, training, and protective equipment on the incidence of laboratory acquired 
infections in healthcare workers and have demonstrated that standard and transmission-based 
precautions reduce rates of acquired infections by 20-60%.46 
Calculating Risk for Clinical Laboratory Analysis 
Clinical laboratory testing requires manipulation of samples and exposure and use of equipment that is 
different from that used for sample collection. Based on the results of Dement et al.,47 we calculated 
manipulation risks for procedures conducted routinely by laboratory technicians for the priority diseases 
identified in the notional priority disease list described in the main body of this report. Aerosol exposure 
was not measured in the Duke study.  Based on historical data, we estimate that aerosol exposure likely 
accounts for the vast majority of unexplained exposures and can account for approximately 50% of the 
overall exposure hazard for those collecting samples. During laboratory testing, pathogens can be 
transmitted via aerosol as a result of processes including pipetting, centrifugation, and culture 
manipulation; we estimate that approximately 40% of exposure is due to aerosol exposure, with 2% 
attributable to centrifugation accidents.48 Manipulation hazards for different experimental procedures 
were calculated by adding the manipulation hazards for percutaneous, mucocutaneous, or aerosol 
exposure. The data is summarized in Table 4.3. Using this data, we developed an approximation for 
ThreatDiagnosis that represents the hazard incurred by each diagnostic procedure.  
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Table 4.3 – Risk based on collection method and manipulation hazard according to diagnostic 
testing algorithms – examples 
Pathogen Sample Collection VAI 
Manipulation 
Hazard Risk 
Bacillus anthracis Blood Syringe 0.0024 0.92 0.002208 
  
Skin lesion 
exudate Swab 0.0024 0.8 0.00192 
  CSF  Syringe 0.0024 0.92 0.002208 
  Pleural fluid Syringe 0.0024 1 0.0024 
  Sputum 
Collection 
cup 0.0024 0.8 0.00192 
  Urine/feces 
Collection 
cup 0.0024 0.8 0.00192 
Brucella spp. Blood Syringe 0.0036 0.92 0.003312 
  Bone marrow Syringe 0.0036 0.92 0.003312 
  CSF Syringe 0.0036 0.92 0.003312 
  
Wound 
fluid/pus Swab 0.0036 0.8 0.00288 
Mycobacterium 
ulcerans Blood Syringe 0.0005 0.92 0.00046 
  Bone marrow Syringe 0.0005 0.92 0.00046 
  CSF Syringe 0.0005 0.92 0.00046 
  
Wound 
fluid/pus Swab 0.0005 0.8 0.0004 
  Biopsy skin punch 0.0005 1 0.0005 
Chikungunya virus Serum Syringe 0.001 0.92 0.00092 




Blood, serum Syringe 
0.036 0.92 0.03312 
  Tissue/skin  skin punch 0.036 1 0.036 
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biopsy 







0.315 0.8 0.252 
Ebola virus 
Whole blood, 
serum,  Syringe 0.5525 0.92 0.5083 
EV71 Stool,  Collection cup 0.03 0.8 0.024 
  Throat swab Swab 0.03 0.8 0.024 
Hepatitis A Blood Syringe 0.0015 0.92 0.00138 
Hepatitis B Blood, serum Syringe 0.006 0.92 0.00552 
Hepatitis C  Blood, serum Syringe 0.001 0.92 0.00092 






0.7875 0.8 0.63 
  Nasopharyngeal aspirate Mucus trap 0.7875 0.8 0.63 
  Broncholavage fluid 
Bronchosco
pe and 
saline 0.7875 0.8 0.63 
  Blood Syringe 0.7875 0.92 0.7245 
Lassa Fever Virus Blood, serum Syringe 0.325 0.92 0.299 
  Tissue  skin punch 0.325 1 0.325 
Mycobacterium 
leprae Skin smear Swab 0.0006 0.8 0.00048 
Wuchereria 
bancrofti  / Brugia 
malayi 
Whole blood Syringe 
0.0005 0.92 0.00046 
Plasmodium 
falciparum Whole blood Syringe 0.02 0.92 0.0184 
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Marburg virus Whole blood, serum Syringe 1.352 0.92 1.24384 
  Tissue Swab, skin punch 1.352 1 1.352 
Measles virus Urine Collection 0.975 0.8 0.78 
  Nasopharyngeal aspirate 
Mucus trap 
0.975 0.8 0.78 
  Blood Syringe  0.975 0.92 0.897 
  Throat swab Swab 0.975 0.8 0.78 
Neisseria 
meningitidis CSF Syringe 0.1265 0.92 0.11638 
  Blood Syringe 0.1265 0.8 0.1012 
Yersinia pestis Whole Blood Syringe 0.7245 0.92 0.66654 
Poliovirus Stool 
Collection 
cup 0.035 0.8 0.028 
  Pharynx swab Swab 0.035 0.8 0.028 
Rabies virus 
Brain (post-
mortum) Biopsy 0.495 1 0.495 
Rift Valley fever 
virus Blood 
Syringe 
0.455 0.92 0.4186 
SARS coronavirus Stool,  Collection cup 1.17 0.8 0.936 
  nasopharyngeal swab Swab 1.17 0.8 0.936 
Shigella dysenteriae  
Stool Collection 
cup 0.0092 0.8 0.00736 
Trypanosoma spp. Whole blood Syringe 0.0495 0.92 0.04554 
  
lymph node 
aspirates Syringe 0.0495 0.92 0.04554 




cup 1.26 0.8 1.008 
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Salmonella typhi Stool sample 
Collection 
cup 0.0175 0.8 0.014 
  Blood Syringe 0.0175 0.92 0.0161 
  Bone marrow Syringe 0.0175 0.92 0.0161 
  Urine 
Collection 
cup 0.0175 0.8 0.014 
West Nile virus 
Whole blood, 
serum, 
plasma, tissue  
Syringe 
0.033 0.92 0.03036 












0.033 0.92 0.03036 
 
Finally, using the framework for appropriate screening, diagnostic, and confirmatory tests to be 
conducted at each level of a tiered, integrated laboratory system (see description in main body of this 
report), we identified the tests most likely to be conducted at health service levels 1 (local health 
facility), 2/3 (intermediate, such as district/provincial), and 4 (central reference laboratory) for the 
pathogens listed in the notional priority disease list to develop an aggregate risk score for the testing 





Table 4.4: Risk scores by diagnostic test and service level 
 
Service 
Level Diagnostic Test 
Risk Scores Likely 
exposure 
risk Average  Range 
1 Rapid Test 0.01152 .0005-.078 P/M 
1-2 Microscopy 0.09452 .0002-.504 P/M 
2-3 Agglutination (serology) 0.08364 .0014-.315 P/M 
2-3 ELISA (serology) 0.15363 .00021-.568 P/M 
2-3 Bacterial Culture/Isolation/Serotype 0.28606 .0004-1.08 P/M/A 
2-3 PCR/RT-PCR 0.04469 .0006-.162 P/M 
2-3 Virus neutralization 0.18693 .00021-.568 P/M/A 
3-4 Antimicrobial susceptibility 0.24693 .013-.567 P/M/A 
3-4 Immunofluorescence 0.28681 .208-.331 P/M 
4 Immunohistochemistry 0.26063 .00031-.838 P/M 
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